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Introduction to Health Care Antitrust Symposium
William C. MacLeod*
The antitrust laws are as sweeping as they are succinct. Read literally,
their sanctions against restraints of trade and monopolization will prohibit
almost any agreement or consolidation, whether it impairs or enhances
competition, in almost every sector of interstate commerce. For more
than a century, courts struggled to limit the laws’ application to only
conduct that threatened competition, and to let the forces of free
enterprise, or the mandates of specific regulations, govern all other
economic activity. Nowhere are those struggles more evident than in two
United States Supreme Court cases that contain one of the most famous
quotes in antitrust history, and in the sector that is the subject of this Issue
Three of Volume 48 of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal.
At least twice, the Supreme Court called the antitrust laws “the Magna
Carta of free enterprise”—the first time in an opinion condemning an
economic integration that the trial court had found to be procompetitive,
and the second time when refusing to apply the laws against a regulated
monopolist.1 In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., the Court held
that licensing restrictions among smaller grocery stores, which helped
them compete against larger chains, were per se illegal.2 Benefits to
interbrand competition were no justification for intrabrand restraints. In
the second case, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP, the Court held that antitrust laws do not require
monopolists to supply competitors who need the supplies to compete,
even if other regulations do impose the duty. 3 If Topco represented the
sweep of the law, then Trinko showed its limits. Both decisions
acknowledged that unrestrained antitrust enforcement could impair
competition, both recognized that the laws will yield where other
regulations apply, but beyond the dissent in Topco and a passing
* Chair, Section of Antitrust, American Bar Association and Partner, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP.
I would like to thank Ilunga Kalala, my associate at Kelley Drye & Warren LLP and Counsel to the
Chair, Section of Antitrust, American Bar Association, for his research assistance.
1. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); U.S.
v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
2. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972).
3. 540 U.S. 398, 411–12 (2004).

627

5_INTRODUCTION_MACLEOD (627-31).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

628

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

5/30/2017 11:51 AM

[Vol. 48

reference in Trinko, neither elaborated on the analysis that distinguishes
procompetitive from anticompetitive effects.4
The same issues frequently arise in the application of antitrust law to
delivery of health care. Significant activity within the sector has been
ceded to state and federal regulators,5 governments pay for more services
than any other buyer, and federal legislation recently restructured
reimbursement practices to expand health care availability and influence
the consumption of medical services. Still, one sixth of the American
economy that comprises health care expenditures remains subject to the
same antitrust laws that govern other businesses. And the health care
industry has been a copious source of antitrust developments—enforcers,
practitioners, experts, and judges have all tried to adapt the principles of
antitrust to protect competition in the health care sector.
From electronic health records to physician licensing, hospital mergers
to drug approvals, the health care industry has many regulated aspects at
the federal, state, and local levels, and by private entities at the
nongovernmental level. In this saturated regulatory market, antitrust laws
and regulation must work together to produce the best results for
consumers, payors, the health care industry, and society. Given the state
of health care in the United States today, there is no time like the present
to emphasize the crucial interplay between health care and competition.
In fact, human capital and the economy depend on it.
As chair of the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association for
2016–17, I therefore asked Professor Spencer Weber Waller and Loyola
University Chicago School of Law to join me in putting together a
symposium to explore these themes. Our goal was to present, through an
interdisciplinary symposium, some of the best minds of academia,
practice, medicine, economics, and public policy to examine the current
state of health care competition and regulation, and future paths to best
serve the public interest. I want to thank Professor Waller, the law school,
the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, and the Beazley Institute for
Health Law and Policy for serving as cosponsors and for hosting the
symposium on September 20, 2016. I also want to thank the Loyola
University Chicago Law Journal for serving as a cosponsor and devoting
this special Symposium Issue to the articles, keynote address, and
comments from the symposium.
The articles in this Issue demonstrate that success in health care

4. Topco, 405 U.S. at 613 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004).
5. The business of insurance, for example, is exempt to the extent that it is regulated by state
law. McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15.
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regulation and competition policy is sometimes elusive: concentration is
high, entry is difficult, services are costly, and efficiency is questioned.
Fortunately, these same articles—individually and collectively—also
grapple with whether competition policy, when properly applied, can
offer valuable benefits to health care providers, payors, patients, and
consumers.
For a sample of the challenges facing health care antitrust, peruse the
keynote address of Dr. Zeke Emanuel, who describes the objectives of
the Affordable Care Act, assesses its progress to date, and predicts
alternative futures of health care finance and delivery. Among his more
provocative propositions are his praise for incentives for reducing the
quantity of services delivered; his preference for regional or national
pricing of services; a call for regulation of hospital pricing; his use of
standardization of services as an indicator of efficiency and quality of
care; and, most importantly, his advocacy of a change in the basis for
physician payments—from fees for services to rewards for outcomes.
His observations on consolidation in the health care industry are of
special relevance to antitrust analysts. The distinctions he draws between
horizontal combinations that increase market share and practice
integrations that improve efficiency are the same issues framing
enforcement and litigation over mergers in the health care sector. Equally
intriguing is his praise of behavioral economics as a guide to improving
medical decision making.
Providing additional context to the current state of health care in the
United States, Rachel Page, a third-year law student at the Loyola
University Chicago School of Law, presents a recent development that
highlights recent federal legislation on a site-neutral payment policy and
the rules that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
implemented regarding the same.6 Different rates for the same service
are familiar terrain for most antitrust nomads, but Ms. Page’s analysis of
new rules of government reimbursement highlights the complexities of
evaluating the true cost of health care while addressing desired population
health outcomes.
For a critical analysis of whether it is even appropriate to evaluate
health care through the lens of antitrust and under a standard economic
theory, take note of Professor Lawrence Singer’s contribution.7
Professor Singer argues that the current health care market lacks in
transparency, and that consumers, by extension, cannot make informed
6. Rachel Page, The Shift Toward Site-Neutral Payment Policy in Medicare 48 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. (forthcoming May 2017).
7. Lawrence Singer, Health Care is Not a Typical Consumer Good and We Should Not Rely on
Incentivized Consumers to Allocate It., 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming May 2017).
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choices. Citing the complex responsibilities of the patient-consumer,
Professor Singer suggests that the influence of procompetitive forces may
actually cause harm to a patient. Always the optimist, Professor Singer
offers a glimmer of hope noting that there “certainly is a place in health
care for a consumer focus on cost and quality.”8
The struggles of litigators and courts to apply the principles of antitrust
to activities in the sector have provoked doubts as to whether it can be
done. Analyzing decades of enforcement history, Professor Waller, who
convened the symposium that inspired these contributions, asks whether
health care developed its own body of antitrust analysis—one that does
not apply elsewhere, and which does not work particularly well here.
Professor Waller declares:
In short, we have reached a fork in the road, and therefore must confront
either returning to the application of traditional antitrust principles in
the health care sector or creating a more conscious and well thought out
comprehensive scheme of sectoral regulation that clearly lays out when
competition rules are secondary to other policy goals.9

Prominent health care practitioners, Roxane Busey and Leigh Oliver,
disagree with the proposition that competition policy in health care has
failed as often, or departed as far from its principles, as Professor Waller
contends.10 Noting many precedents in other industries on which courts
have relied to shape health care rulings, the attorneys argue that antitrust
is alive and well in the health care sector, notwithstanding the numerous
regulations and exemptions the courts must navigate.
Agreeing with Ms. Busey and Ms. Oliver, and taking issue with
Professor Waller, Dr. Paul Wong and Dr. Lawrence Wu argue that
antitrust enforcement is more likely to improve health care than the
regulations:
One should be skeptical that new regulation and regulatory processes
can handle the complexity and case-specific nature of competition
issues in health care. But the courts are well equipped to do just this, as
they are armed with the ability to consider case- and time-specific facts
and to apply antitrust law with those facts in mind. The health care
industry is not at a fork in the road and it has not lost its way when it
comes to antitrust. In fact, applying antitrust in health care is the road
that has always been traveled, and with the right antitrust principles in
8. Id.
9. Spencer Weber Waller, How Much of Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?, 48 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. (forthcoming May 2017).
10. Roxane C. Busey, A View from the Trenches: A Reply to Professor Waller’s “How Much
Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?,” 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming May 2017); Leigh
Oliver, It Is All About the Facts: Commentary on the Current State of Antitrust Enforcement in
Health Care, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming May 2017).
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hand to lead the way, the industry will continue to move forward, not
backward.11

On some of the narrower issues, the symposium contributors found it
easier to agree. Richman et al., for example, suggest that megamergers
in the pharmaceutical industry may actually invigorate the marketplace
for discovery and that alternative information mechanisms and active
financing markets could mitigate and counteract concentration
concerns.12 Dynamic forces are at play in the pharmaceutical industry,
and Richman et al.’s analysis of merger and acquisition trends in the
pharmaceutical industry leaves us with some surprising, if not thoughtprovoking, conclusions for competition policy and innovation.
Most encouraging to this reader is the fact that virtually all the
contributors find hopeful prospects for the future of antitrust in health
care. In addition to Dr. Emanuel’s grand vision and Professor Waller’s
two paths, the article by Professor David Hyman and Professor William
Kovacic describes simple changes to the regulation for drug
reimbursements that could allow market forces to reduce prices. 13 And
Professor William M. Sage and Professor Hyman envision a future with
advancing innovation and receding regulation—with antitrust
enforcement facilitating the shifts.14 Their article suggests that declining
concentration and new forms practice could emerge—some resembling
the changes Dr. Emanuel hopes to see. Likewise, they address some of
the concerns Professor Waller and Professor Singer express about the
ability of antitrust enforcement to clean the barnacles of bad decisions
that may have reduced competition and impeded efficiency without
protecting the quality in this sector that is critical to the economy and to
every consumer in it.
Each article in this Issue delivers a valuable lesson on antitrust in
health care. Together, they present an entire course. Policymakers would
do well to peruse these pages. If just some of the ideas presented by the
authors here make their way to the marketplace, patients could enjoy
better care at lower costs. In other words, antitrust can heal the ailments
in this health care market, just as it has in many others.

11. Paul Wong & Lawrence Wu, Health Care Antitrust: Are Courts Adapting to a Complex and
Dynamic Industry or Are They Making Exceptions?, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming May 2017).
12. Barak Richman et al., Pharmaceutical M&A Activity: Effects on Prices, Innovation, and
Competition, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming May 2017).
13. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Health Care Competition Law in the Shadow of
State Action: Minimizing MACs, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming May 2017).
14. William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Antitrust as Disruptive Innovation in Health Care:
Can Limiting State Action Immunity Help Save a Trillion Dollars?, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
(forthcoming May 2017).

